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Abstract
It is well-known that a transferable utility game has a non-empty core if and only if it is
balanced. In the class of non-transferable utility games balancedness or the more general p-
balancedness due to Billera (SIAM J. Appl. Math. 18 (1970) 567) is a sufﬁcient, but not a
necessary condition for the core to be non-empty. This paper gives a natural extension of the
p-balancedness condition that is both necessary and sufﬁcient for non-emptiness of the core.
r 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
JEL classification: C71
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1. Introduction
A cooperative game with non-transferable utility is an assignment of a set of
feasible utility allocations to each coalition of players. The core of a cooperative
game selects those utility allocations that are robust to all possible deviations by
coalitions.
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In Bondareva [2] and in Shapley [8] the notion of a balanced game has been
introduced for games with transferable utility (TU-games). It has been demonstrated
that a TU-game has a non-empty core if and only if it is a balanced game. Scarf [7]
has extended the condition of balancedness to games with non-transferable utility
(NTU-games) and proved that every balanced NTU-game has a non-empty core.
Billera [1] has further generalized the notion of a balanced game. In his work
the balancedness condition is deﬁned with respect to a system p of coalitional
vectors specifying the power or weight of each agent within every coalition. The
existence of the system of the coalitional vectors p such that the game is p-balanced
sufﬁces for the core to be non-empty. Moreover, when attention is restricted to
hyperplane games, a non-empty core implies p-balancedness for an appropriate
choice of p: In general, the equivalence of p-balanced games and games with a non-
empty core does not hold: an example of a game with a non-empty core that is not
balanced for any choice of p is given in Billera [1]. Generalizations of Billera’s
balancedness conditions have been given for cooperative games in permutational
structure (see [10]) and cooperative games in graph structure (see [4]). These
conditions weaken p-balancedness and are sufﬁcient for the core to be non-empty,
although not necessary.
A natural generalization of the p-balancedness condition is achieved by allowing
the system of coalitional vectors p to depend on the utility allocations. In this paper
we deﬁne the balancedness of the game with respect to a correspondence P that
assigns to each allocation of utilities a set of coalitional vectors p: We therefore allow
the power of an agent within a coalition to depend on the utility allocation that is
proposed. We prove that the core of an NTU-game is non-empty if it is balanced
with respect to some correspondence P: Conversely, for a given game with a non-
empty core we construct a correspondence P satisfying the condition of P-
balancedness. Thus, P-balancedness is not only a sufﬁcient, but also a necessary
condition for non-emptiness of the core.
To the best of our knowledge, the only alternative necessary and sufﬁcient
balancedness condition for non-emptiness of the core is given by Keiding and
Thorlund-Petersen [6]. The advantage of our P-balancedness condition over the
condition in Keiding and Thorlund-Petersen [6] is that it applies directly to the game
of interest and avoids the construction of any auxiliary games or sequences of
approximating games.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 some notation is introduced.
In Section 3 we discuss the p-balancedness condition of Billera [1] and the
ðp;oÞ-balancedness condition of Keiding and Thorlund-Petersen [6].2 In
Section 4 the P-balancedness condition is deﬁned and the main result of the
paper is proved. In Section 5 we examine an example (due to Billera [1]) of a
game which has a non-empty core without being p-balanced for any system of
coalitional vectors p:
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2 In the paper of Keiding and Thorlund-Petersen [6] a somewhat different deﬁnition of a non-
transferable utility game is given. In particular, the set VðSÞ is assumed to lie entirely in the non-negative
orthant of Rn and to contain the zero vector. The set VpðSÞ is assumed to be bounded for all SAN:
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2. Notation
Let n be a positive integer. Then N is the set of integers f1;y; ng; and N is the
collection of non-empty subsets of the set N: Rn is the space of functions
x : iAN/xiAR: RN is the space of functions l : SAN/lSAR: Let DN denote the
unit simplex in Rn; DN ¼ fxARn j xiX0 8iAN;
P
iAN x
i ¼ 1g: For every SAN deﬁne
the set DS ¼ fxADN j
P
iAS x
i ¼ 1g; and let D be a Cartesian product of DS over
all SAN: Let DN denote the unit simplex in RN; DN ¼
flARN j lSX0 8SAN;
P
SAN lS ¼ 1g: If x and y are elements of Rn; then x 	 y
denotes the scalar product of x and y; that is x 	 y ¼PiAN xiyi: For each SAN let 1S
be the vector in Rn with component 1iS equal to 1 if iAS and equal to 0 otherwise.
For a subset A of Rn; the symbols int A and @A denote, respectively, the interior and
the boundary of A:
3. p-Balancedness and ðp;oÞ-balancedness
An n-person game with non-transferable utility (hereafter referred to simply as a
game) is a family of sets V ¼ /VðSÞSSAN satisfying the following assumptions:
ðG1Þ For all SAN; VðSÞ is a non-empty proper closed subset of Rn:
ðG2Þ For all SAN; ½xAVðSÞ; yARn; yipxi for all iAS implies ½yAVðSÞ:
ðG3Þ The set VðNÞ\SiAN int VðfigÞ is non-empty and compact.
A vector xARn is an element of the core of the game V if xAVðNÞ and there exist no
SAN and no yAVðSÞ such that xioyi for all iAS: The core of the game V is
denoted by CðVÞ: Therefore,
CðVÞ ¼ VðNÞ
[
SAN
int VðSÞ
-
:
Below we reproduce the p-balancedness condition of Billera [1]. Let an element p
of the set D be given. A collection of coalitions bDN is said to be p-balanced if there
exists lADN such that
pN ¼
X
SAb
lSpS:
A game V is said to be p-balanced if for every p-balanced collection of coalitions
bDN it holds that\
SAb
VðSÞDVðNÞ:
If there exists some pAD such that the game V is p-balanced, then the core of V is
non-empty.
The p-balancedness condition has been generalized in the work of Keiding and
Thorlund-Petersen [6]. Given a game V and a coalition SAN let VpðSÞ ¼
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fxSARSþ j xAVðSÞg; where RSþ is the set of non-negative functions with domain S;
and xS is the restriction of the function xARn to the set S:1 Let R denote the set of
binary relations o on the set N satisfying the following conditions:
* o is acyclic: If SjAN for all jAf1;y; kg and S1oS2o?oSk; then we cannot
have SkoS1:
* All one player coalitions are minimal: For all iAN there is no SAN such that
Sofig:
Let pAD andoAR be given. A game V is said to be ðp;oÞ-balanced if the following
condition is satisﬁed: If bDN is a p-balanced collection of coalitions and
xA
\
SAb
VðSÞ
[
QAN; TAb: QoT
int VðQÞ
-
;
then xAVðNÞ: The game V is said to be weakly ðp;oÞ-balanced if there exists a
sequence fV tgNt¼1 of ðp;oÞ-balanced games such that
* VðNÞ ¼ V tðNÞ for all t; and
* for every SAN the sequence fV tpðSÞgNt¼1 converges to the set VpðSÞ in the
topology induced by the Hausdorff metric on the set of non-empty compact
subsets of Rn:
Theorem 1 below gives a characterization of NTU-games with a non-empty core.
Theorem 1 (Keiding and Thorlund-Petersen [6]). Let V be a game. Then the core of
V is non-empty if and only if there exist pAD; oAR; and a weakly ðp;oÞ-balanced
game V 0 such that VðNÞ ¼ V 0ðNÞ and VðSÞDV 0ðSÞ for all SAN:
The purpose of the next section is to give a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for
non-emptiness of the core that applies directly to the game of interest V : In
particular, our condition of P-balancedness avoids the construction of an auxiliary
game like V 0 and does not use the approximation of the game V 0 by a sequence of
games fV tgNt¼1:
4. P-Balancedness
As a preliminary result we state the P-balanced version of the weak Knaster,
Kuratowski, Mazurkiewicz, and Shapley (K–K–M–S) theorem. The original version
of the K–K–M–S theorem can be found in Shapley [9]. Theorem 2 can be easily
established using the ﬁxed point theorem of Kakutani (analogous to the proof of the
K–K–M–S theorem in Herings [3]).
Theorem 2 (P-balanced weak K–K–M–S). Let fCSDDN j SANg be a closed cover
of DN such that if S and T are elements of N and the set DT-CS is non-empty, then
SDT : Let P : DN-D be a convex-valued correspondence with a closed graph. Then
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there exist xADN ; pAPðxÞ; and lADN such that
xA
\
SAN: lS40
CS;
pN ¼
X
SAN
lSp

S:
Deﬁnition 1. Let a game V and a convex-valued correspondence P :Rn-D with a
closed graph be given. The game V is said to be P-balanced provided that the
following condition is satisﬁed: If xARn; pAPðxÞ; and lADN are such that
xA
\
SAN:lS40
VðSÞ;
pN ¼
X
SAN
lSpS;
then xAVðNÞ:
The p-balancedness condition of Billera [1] is deﬁned relative to a ﬁxed element p
of the set D: It corresponds to the special case of Deﬁnition 1 where P is single-
valued and independent of the utility allocation. By using the concept of P-
balancedness, we allow the power of an agent within a coalition to depend on the
utility allocation that is proposed.
Theorem 3. Let V be a game. Suppose that there exists a convex-valued
correspondence P :Rn-D with a closed graph such that the game V is P-balanced.
Then the core of the game V is non-empty.
We do not report the proof of Theorem 3. Our argument essentially replicates the
proof of the Scarf’s theorem given in Kannai [5]. The key role in the proof of
Theorem 3 is played by the P-balanced weak K–K–M–S theorem.
Theorem 4 below asserts that P-balancedness is not only a sufﬁcient, but also a
necessary condition for the non-emptiness of the core.
Theorem 4. Let V be a game with a non-empty core. Then there exists a convex-
valued correspondence P :Rn-D with a closed graph such that the game V is P-
balanced.
Proof. We make use of the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let V be a game and let SAN: Then
1. for every xARn there exists a unique real number tSðxÞ such that ðx 
tSðxÞ1SÞA@VðSÞ;
2. the function tS : x/tSðxÞ is a continuous function;
3. xAVðSÞ if and only if tSðxÞp0; xARn\int VðSÞ if and only if tSðxÞX0:
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Deﬁne the continuous mapping gS :R
n-@VðSÞ by gSðxÞ ¼ x  tSðxÞ1S for all
xARn:
Let x be an element of the core of the game V : Deﬁne the correspondence
P :Rn-D by letting the set PðxÞ be the product of the sets PSðxÞ; where
PSðxÞ ¼ fpSADS j pS 	 gSðxÞ ¼ pS 	 gSðxÞg
for all SAN and xARn:
To see that the set PSðxÞ is non-empty, observe that it is given by the intersection
of the sets PS ðxÞ and PþS ðxÞ; where
PS ðxÞ ¼ fpSADS j pS 	 gSðxÞppS 	 gSðxÞg;
PþS ðxÞ ¼ fpSADS j pS 	 gSðxÞXpS 	 gSðxÞg:
If the set PS ðxÞ were empty for some xARn; then the inequality pS 	 gSðxÞ4pS 	
gSðxÞ would be satisﬁed for all pSADS: In particular, this inequality would hold for
all vertices of the simplex DS; implying that giSðxÞ4giSðxÞ for all iAS: As
gSðxÞA@VðSÞ; this would imply gSðxÞAint VðSÞ; contradicting the deﬁnition of gS:
A similar argument shows that the set PþS ðxÞ is non-empty. Moreover, both sets
PS ðxÞ and PþS ðxÞ are closed, and PS ðxÞ,PþS ðxÞ ¼ DS: Connectedness of the set DS
implies that the intersection of PS ðxÞ and PþS ðxÞ is non-empty.
Convexity of the sets PSðxÞ is trivial.
To prove that the graph of the correspondence P is closed, let ðxðkÞ; pðkÞÞ be a
sequence of points in Rn  D satisfying pðkÞAPðxðkÞÞ and converging to some point
ðxð0Þ; pð0ÞÞ: Then the equalities
pSðkÞ 	 gSðxÞ ¼ pSðkÞ 	 gSðxðkÞÞ; SAN
hold for all members of the sequence. By continuity of the mappings gS; it holds in
the limit that
pSð0Þ 	 gSðxÞ ¼ pSð0Þ 	 gSðxð0ÞÞ; SAN:
Therefore, pð0ÞAPðxð0ÞÞ:
Next we show that the game V is P-balanced. Let xARn; pAPðxÞ; and lADN be
such that
xA
\
SAN: lS40
VðSÞ;
pN ¼
X
SAN
lSpS:
By part (3) of Lemma 1, for all SAN with lS40 it holds that tSðxÞp0: As
xeint VðSÞ; we have 0ptSðxÞ: It follows that for all SAN with lS40 the
following inequalities hold:
pS 	 xp pS 	 gSðxÞ
¼ pS 	 gSðxÞ
p pS 	 x:
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Therefore,
pN 	 x ¼
X
SAN: lS40
lSpS 	 x
p
X
SAN: lS40
lSpS 	 x
¼ pN 	 x
¼ pN 	 gNðxÞ
¼ pN 	 gNðxÞ;
where the second to last equality is implied by the fact that x ¼ gNðxÞ: By
deﬁnition of gNðxÞ; this gives the inequality tNðxÞp0; and the inclusion
xAVðNÞ: &
Theorems 3 and 4 show that P-balancedness is necessary and sufﬁcient for non-
emptiness of the core. The condition is relatively simple and provides a natural
extension of p-balanced concept of Billera that closes the gap between necessary and
sufﬁcient conditions for non-emptiness of the core.
5. An example
In this section we examine the example from Billera [1] of a game which has a non-
empty core without being p-balanced for any system of coalitional vectors p: We
show that there is a natural choice of the correspondence P such that the game in
question is P-balanced. In addition, we demonstrate that the game is not ðp;oÞ-
balanced for any p and any binary operationo; and construct an artiﬁcial game V 0
satisfying the condition of Theorem 1.
Let V be a game with three players where
Vðf1; 2; 3gÞ ¼ fxAR3 j x1p1; x2p1; x3p0g;
Vðf1; 2gÞ ¼ fxAR3 j x1 þ x2p2g;
VðSÞ ¼ fxAR3 j xip0 for all iASg for any SaN; f1; 2g:
The game V has a unique core-element, ð1; 1; 0Þ:
We show that there is no pAD such that V is a p-balanced game. Suppose ﬁrst that
the vector pN has at least one zero component. Then the collection of singletons
b ¼ ffig j piN40g is a p-balanced collection of coalitions, whereas the intersectionT
SAb VðSÞ is not a subset of VðNÞ:
Suppose that all components of the vector p are positive. We can then assume
without loss of generality that piN ¼ 1n for all iAN: Now, if p1f1;2g ¼ p2f1;2g then the
collection of coalitions a ¼ ff1; 2g; f3gg is p-balanced. Since the vector ð2; 0; 0Þ is
an element of Vðf1; 2gÞ and Vðf3gÞ but not of Vðf1; 2; 3gÞ; the condition of
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p-balancedness is violated. In case p1f1;2g4p
2
f1;2g the collection b ¼ ff1; 2g; f2g; f3gg
is p-balanced, with ð2; 0; 0Þ being feasible for each S in b: Finally, if p1f1;2gop2f1;2g
then the collection of coalitions g ¼ ff1; 2g; f1g; f3gg is p-balanced. In this case the
vector ð0; 2; 0Þ violates the p-balancedness condition.
Having these considerations in mind it is straightforward to construct a
correspondence P such that the game V is P-balanced. In particular, there should
be no p in Pð2; 0; 0Þ such that either a or b is a p-balanced collection of coalitions.
There also should be no pAPð0; 2; 0Þ such that the collection g is balanced relative to
p: We let
Pf1;2gðxÞ ¼
fða; b; 0Þg if x1ox2;
Df1;2g if x1 ¼ x2;
fðb; a; 0Þg if x14x2;
8><
>:
where the numbers a and b satisfy a4bX0 and a þ b ¼ 1: For any coalition
Saf1; 2g we let PSðxÞ equal the barycenter of DS:
To see that V is balanced relative to P let xARn; pAPðxÞ; and lADN be such that
xA
\
SAb
VðSÞ;
pN ¼
X
SAN
lSpS;
where b ¼ fSAN : lS40g: If NAb there is nothing to prove. We therefore assume
that Neb: Suppose also that the coalition f1; 2g is not a member of the collection b:
Since p1N40; b must contain either the coalition f1g or the coalition f1; 3g; or both.
In either case x1p0: Similar reasoning for x2 and x3 shows that none of them is
positive. Hence, xAVðNÞ:
Now consider the case where the coalition f1; 2g is a member of b: If x1ox2 then,
by construction of the correspondence P; p1f1;2g4p
2
f1;2g: Therefore, the collection b
must contain either coalition f2g or coalition f2; 3g; or both, so x2p0: Since p3N40;
there is at least one coalition in b which contains player 3; so that x3p0: Thus, x
belongs to VðNÞ: If x2ox1 then p2f1;2g4p1f1;2g implying that b contains either the
singleton f1g or the coalition f1; 3g: In both cases, x1p0: As before, we have x3p0:
Thus, xAVðNÞ: Finally, if x1 equals x2 then both of them are less than or equal to 1,
and therefore x belongs to VðNÞ:
Turning to the condition of Keiding and Thorlund-Petersen, observe that the
vectors ð2; 0; 0Þ and ð0; 2; 0Þ are not in the interior of any of the feasibility sets VðSÞ
of the game V : Hence, our argument that V is not a p-balanced game for any p is
valid as a proof that it is not a ðp;oÞ-balanced game for any p and any oAR: Let
V 0 be a game where
V 0ðfigÞ ¼ fxAR3 j xip1g for i ¼ 1; 2;
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and V 0ðSÞ ¼ VðSÞ for all other coalitions S: Choose p in D so that piN40 for all
iAN: LetoAR be a binary relation satisfying figof1; 2g for i ¼ 1; 2; 3: Then V 0 is a
ðp;oÞ-balanced game. Indeed, let b be a p-balanced collection of coalitions and let x
be an element of the set\
SAb
V 0ðSÞ
[
QAN; TAb: QoT
int V 0ðQÞ
-
:
If the coalition f1; 2g is not in b then one can argue as in the case with P-
balancedness that xAV 0ðNÞ: If f1; 2g is a member of the collection b then x must lie
outside the interior of V 0ðfigÞ for all iAN; which implies that x1X1; x2X1; and
x3X0: Thus, x ¼ ð1; 1; 0Þ; which belongs to V 0ðNÞ:
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